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In an associative learning preparation, the participants were given  partial
reinforcement (PRF) with  two  different cues.  For  one  of  the  cues,  the
nonreinforced presentations consisted of pairings of the cue with  a neutral
outcome, whereas these presentations consisted of pairings with an aversive
outcome for the other cue. The results showed that PRF  training produced
strong responding to the cue paired  with  the  neutral  outcome  on  the
nonreinforced trials, whereas responding to the cue paired with the aversive
outcome on the nonreinforced trials was strongly suppressed. The present
results are problematic for current theories of learning (e.g.,  Rescorla &
Wagner,  1972),  but  can  be  explained  by  classical  theories  involving
motivational mechanisms (e.g., Konorski, 1967), as well as by  a recently
developed model, in which incompatible outcome expectations compete for
their expression into behavior (i.e., Pineño & Matute, 2003).
Since  Pavlov  (1927)  performed  his  original  studies  on  classical
conditioning, it is well known that a conditioned response to a conditioned
stimulus (CS), formed due to the repeated pairing of the  CS  with  an
unconditioned stimulus (US), can be attenuated through either presentations
of the CS without the US (i.e., experimental extinction) or presentations of the
CS with a motivationally antagonistic US (i.e., counterconditioning). The fact
that both experimental procedures result in a decrease in the strength and/or
frequency of the response has encouraged many theorists of learning to
explain extinction and counterconditioning through common mechanisms.
Pavlov (1927; see also Konorski, 1948), explained extinction as due to the
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formation of an inhibitory CS-US association, different in  nature to  the
excitatory  CS-US  association,  and  counterconditioning  as  due  to  the
development of an excitatory association between the CS and the new US. By
contrast,  Konorski  (1967)  proposed  that  both  extinction  and
counterconditioning are based on the formation of  excitatory associations.
Specifically, during extinction and counterconditioning, the representation (or
gnostic unit, in his terminology) of the CS becomes associated with the
representation of the noUS or the new US,  respectively. According to
Konorski,  the  activation  of  the  representation  of  a  US  from  a  given
motivational system (i.e., US1) is incompatible with the  activation of  the
representation of the noUS1 or the representation of a US from a different
motivational system (i.e., US2). In other words,  these representations are
mutually antagonistic and their activations are reciprocally inhibited (see also
Rescorla & Solomon, 1967; Solomon & Corbit, 1974).
This view of Konorski (1967) implies that, after pairings of a CS with
US1, CS-noUS1 trials (extinction) and CS-US2 (counterconditioning) can be
perceived by the animal as motivationally equivalent. For example, when US1
and US2 consist of food and footshock, respectively, the absence of US1 (just
like the presence of US2) can produce an aversive reaction (e.g., frustration,
Amsel, 1958), and the absence of US2 (just like the presence of US1) can
produce an appetitive reaction (e.g., relaxation, Denny, 1971). This functional
equivalence of the representations of the noUS1 and the US2 regarding their
potential to interfere with the activation of the US1 does not necessarily imply
that the noUS1 and US2 will produce a similar degree of interference. It can be
assumed that the impact of CS-US2 trials will be always higher than that of
CS-noUS1  trials.  There  are  two  reasons  for  this.  First,  the  physical
presentation of US2 can be expected to be more salient than the mere absence
of  US1.  Second,  the  presentation of  CS-US2  trials  also  implies  the
presentation of CS-noUS1 trials, therefore allowing for learning of both CS-
noUS1 and CS-US2 associations (Bouton, 1993).
The explanation of  extinction and  counterconditioning offered  by
Konorski (1967), therefore, not only explains both phenomena according to a
single mechanism (learning of an excitatory CS-antagonistic US association),
but also explains why counterconditioning treatment usually shows a higher
effectiveness than extinction treatment in  the  suppression  of  the  target
response (e.g., Gambrill, 1967; Moore, 1986). Konorski’s view had  few
precedents in the field of associative learning due to its ability to provide an
integrated account of many different phenomena of  interference between
outcomes. For example, both extinction and counterconditioning phenomena
are explained as effects that arise from learning of an association between the
CS  and  a  different  US  (i.e.,  noUS1  in  extinction,  and  US2  in
counterconditioning). Proactive counterconditioning (i.e., impaired responding
during CS-US2 trials due to previous CS-US1 pairings, see e.g., Krank, 1985;
Scavio, 1974) can be also seen as analogous to latent inhibition (i.e., impaired
responding during CS-US1 trials due to previous CS-noUS1  presentations,
see e.g., Lubow, 1973). Also, the conditioned suppression suffered by  an
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(e.g., Annau & Kamin, 1961; Bolles & Fanselow, 1980; Bouton & Bolles,
1980; Church, 1969; Estes & Skinner, 1941) can be explained by this theory
as functionally equivalent to the summation test of conditioned inhibition (i.e.,
decrease of responding to a CS due to the simultaneous presentation of an
inhibitor of the US; Rescorla, 1969). More importantly, Konorski’s theory
encouraged a great amount of research that supported many of  its elegant
predictions (see, e.g., Goodman & Fowler, 1983; Dickinson, 1977; Dickinson
& Dearing, 1979; see Dickinson & Pearce, 1977, for a review).
However, these features of Konorski’s (1967) theory have been largely
ignored by traditional models of classical conditioning (e.g., Mackintosh,
1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Wagner, 1981). First,
some of these models (e.g., Mackintosh, 1975; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) do
not acknowledge the  possibility  of  concurrent  CS-US  and  CS-noUS
associations. According to these models, excitatory and inhibitory learning
consist, respectively, on the increase or decrease of the net strength of  an
association between the representations of the  CS  and  the  US  (but  see
Bouton, 1993; Pearce, 1987; Pearce & Hall, 1980; Wagner, 1981). Second,
according  to  all  these  models,  extinction and  counterconditioning are
exclusively due to the absence of the US that was previously paired with the
CS during the original acquisition phase. This is clearly represented in the
learning rule of the Rescorla-Wagner model:
( )
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In this equation, 
n
CS V D  represents the change in associative strength of
the CS on trial n. a and b are learning-rate parameters representing the
salience of the CS and the US, respectively. These parameters adopt values
between 0 and 1,  as  a  function of  their corresponding salience (in  the
Rescorla-Wagner model, the perceived physical intensity). The parenthetical
term (i.e., 
1 - -
n
T V l ) represents the discrepancy between  the  amount  of
associative strength that can be supported by the US (l) and the current total
associative strength acquired, until trial n-1, by all the CSs present on trial n
(
1 - n
T V ). The value of l will depend on the presence or absence of the US on
trial n: when the US is presented, l adopts a value of 1; when the US  is
absent, l adopts a value of 0.
Therefore, the acquisition of a conditioned response to a CS (i.e., CS-
US trials) occurs,  according to  the  Rescorla-Wagner model, due  to  a
progressive strengthening (up to 1) of the CS-US association, based on the
discrepancy between the expected and actual occurrence of  the  US  (i.e.,
1 1
- -
n
T V ). Since this discrepancy will be smaller as the acquisition training
proceeds, the increments of the associative strength gained by the CS will be
also smaller, resulting in a progressively decelerated curve of acquisition.
During extinction training (i.e., CS-noUS trials), the associative strength of
the CS decreases (down to 0) due to the existing discrepancy between theO. Pineño 90
expectation of the US and its actual absence (i.e., 
1 0
- -
n
T V ).  As occurred
during acquisition, this discrepancy will be smaller as the extinction training
proceeds, resulting in smaller negative increments of the associative strength
and, hence, in a progressively decelerated curve of extinction.
Importantly,  in  the  Rescorla-Wagner  (1972)  model  (see  also
Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980; Wagner, 1981) the value of l is
exclusively determined by the presence or absence of its corresponding US.
Therefore, according to the Rescorla-Wagner model, whether an expected US
is merely absent (as occurs during extinction) or replaced by another US (as
occurs during counterconditioning) is completely irrelevant. Thus, whereas
Konorski (1967) viewed extinction as a kind of  counterconditioning, the
traditional models of learning (e.g., Rescorla  &  Wagner)  contemplate
counterconditioning a kind of extinction. As a consequence, the traditional
models of learning (contrary to Konorski), are unable to explain the higher
effectiveness of counterconditioning treatment than of extinction treatment in
suppressing conditioned behavior (e.g., Gambrill, 1967; Moore, 1986).
The  fact  that  the  suppression  of  behavior  to  a  CS  due  to  its
counterconditioning with a different US occurs at  a  faster rate than  the
extinction of behavior due to the mere nonreinforcement of the CS might be
viewed as unchallenging because in both  procedures, regardless  of  the
different rates, responding does decrease. However, a completely different
outcome can be expected if the  different trial  types  of  extinction and
counterconditioning are interspersed during training. In the case of extinction,
interspersing the CS-US1 and CS-noUS1 trials would result in the typical
partial reinforcement (PRF) procedure (e.g., Hartman & Grant, 1960), which
is  known  to  produce  persistent responding  in  the  face  of  subsequent
extinction  (Amsel,  1958).  But,  in  the  case  of  counterconditioning,
interspersing the CS-US1 and CS-US2  trials would result in both a PRF
procedure and a partial punishment procedure, which is known to yield strong
and persistent suppression of the response (e.g., Storms & Boroczi, 1966). In
this situation, according to the traditional models of learning (e.g., Rescorla &
Wagner, 1972), responding to a CS, A, trained with both US1 and the absence
of US1 should be similar to responding to a CS, B, trained with US1 and US2,
whereas according to Konorski (1967; see also Rescorla & Solomon, 1967;
Solomon & Corbit, 1974) responding to CS  B  should be more strongly
suppressed than responding to CS A.
The  present  experiment  was  performed  in  order  to  test  whether
responding to a partially reinforced cue (i.e., analogous to the CS  in the
terminology  of  human  associative  learning)  can  be  affected  by  the
motivational value of the outcome (i.e., analogous  to  the  US  in  the
terminology of associative learning) presented on  the nonreinforced trials.
Three motivationally different outcomes were used in this experiment: an
appetitive outcome (i.e., OAp), an aversive outcome (i.e., OAv), and a neutral
outcome (i.e., ONe). The motivational value of these outcomes was  given
exclusively through instructions: the participants could either gain or  lose
points by responding on those trials in which the cue was followed by OAp orNonreinforcement and Punishment 91
OAv, respectively. The number of gained or lost points on each trial positively
correlated with the number of responses performed during the presentation of
the cue. The participants were also instructed about the possibility of neither
gaining nor losing points on a given trial, therefore providing a third, neutral,
outcome (i.e., ONe). It is also important to mention that the number of points
accrued by the participants during their performance with the task was not
interchanged by  any  good  after  the  experiment, such  as  money  (e.g.,
O’Donnell,  Crosbie,  Williams,  &  Saunders,  2000).  Therefore,  the
instructions, together with the participants’ interest in  achieving a  high
performance with the task (i.e., to accrue a high number of points) provided
the motivational value of the different outcomes used in the experiment.
The critical question in this experiment was: is responding to a partially
reinforced cue affected by the motivational value of the outcome presented on
the nonreinforced trials? In order to answer this question, all participants were
exposed to two different cues, A and B, trained in a PRF schedule: cues A and
B were reinforced in the 50% of the trials (i.e., A-OAp or B-OAp trials) and
nonreinforced in the other 50% of the trials. However, for  cue  A  the
nonreinforced trials consisted of trials in which the cue was followed by the
neutral outcome (i.e., A-ONe trials), whereas for cue B the nonreinforced trials
consisted of trials in which the cue was followed by the aversive outcome (i.e.,
cue B-OAv trials).
METHOD
Participants and Apparatus. The participants were fourteen students
(1 man and 13 women, with a mean age of 19.85 years [SEM = 0.36]) from
Deusto University, volunteered for the study. The experiment was conducted
using personal computers and participants were run in individual cubicles.
Design and Procedure. The preparation used in this experiment was
the same as that previously used by Pineño and colleagues for the study of
associative learning with humans (e.g., Pineño, Ortega, &  Matute, 2000;
Pineño & Matute, 2000)
1. In this preparation, participants were asked to
imagine that they were to rescue a group of refugees by helping them escape
from a war zone in trucks. A translation of the instructions from Spanish
reads as follows:
                                    
1  A  demonstration  version  of  this  preparation  can  be  downloaded  from
http://sirio.deusto.es/matute/software.html         
(see also     http://bingweb.binghamton.edu/~learning/task.htm       for new adaptation of  this
preparation).O. Pineño 92
Screen 1
Imagine that you are a soldier for the United Nations. Your mission
consists  of  rescuing  a  group  of  refugees  that  are  hidden  in  a
ramshackle building. The enemy has detected them and has sent forces
to destroy the building... But, fortunately, they rely on your cunning to
escape the danger zone before that happens.
You have several trucks for rescuing the refugees, and you have to help
them get into those trucks. There are two ways of placing people in the
trucks:
Pressing the space bar repeatedly, so that one person per press  is
placed in a truck.
Maintaining the space bar pressed down, so that you will be able to
load people very rapidly.
If you rescue a number of persons in a given trip, they will arrive to
their destination alive, and you will be rewarded with a point for each
person. You must gain as many points as possible!
Screen 2
But... your mission will not be as simple as it seems. The enemy knows
of your movements and could have placed deadly mines on the road. If
the truck hits a mine, it will explode, and the passengers will die. Each
dead passenger will count as one negative point for you.
Fortunately, the colored lights on the SPY-RADIO will tell you about
the state of the road. These lights can indicate that:
The road will be free of mines. Æ The occupants of the truck will be
liberated. Æ You will gain points.
The road will be mined. Æ The occupants of the truck will die. Æ You
will lose points.
There are no mines, but the road is closed. Æ The occupants of the
truck will neither die nor be liberated. Æ You will neither gain nor lose
points: You will maintain your previous score.
Screen 3
At first, you will not know what each color light of the SPY-RADIO
means. However, as you gain experience with them, you will learn to
interpret what they mean.
Thus, we recommend that you:
Place more people in the truck the more certain you are that the road
will be free of mines (keep the space bar continuously pressed down
ONLY if you are completely sure that there are no mines, because in
this way you will put a lot of people in the truck...).
Introduce less people in the truck the more certain you are that the
road is mined.Nonreinforcement and Punishment 93
After these instructions, participants were shown a fourth screen that
gave instructions about contextual changes. Although contextual changes were
not used in the present experiment, in order to avoid making more changes
than necessary between different experimental series conducted with the same
preparation, we maintained the fourth instruction screen programmed in the
task. A translation of the fourth instruction screen read as follows:
Screen 4
Finally, it is important to know that your mission may take place in
several different towns. The colors on the SPY-RADIO can mean the
same or a very different thing depending on the town in which you are.
Thus, it is important to pay attention to the message that indicates the
place in which you are. If you travel to another town, the message
indicating the name  of  the  town  will change. When  a  change of
destination is occurring, you will read  the  message  ‘Traveling to
another town’, so you will be continuously informed  about  such
changes. Nevertheless, sometimes you might end up returning to the
same town even if you have seen the message that indicates that you
are traveling.
Do not worry if all this looks like very complex at this point. Before we
start, you will have the opportunity to see the location of everything
(radio, town name, messages, scores, etc.) on the screen, and to ask
the experimenter about anything that is unclear.
The cues were presented in the spy-radio, which consisted of six panels
in which colored lights could be presented. Cues A and B  were blue and
yellow lights, counterbalanced. All cues were presented for 3 s. On each trial,
the termination of the cue coincided with the presentation of an outcome. The
appetitive outcome (OAp) consisted of (a) the message ‘[n] refugees safe at
home!!!’ (with [n] being the number of  refugees introduced in the truck
during the cue presentation) and, (b) gaining one point for each refugee who
was liberated. The aversive outcome (OAv) consisted of (a) the message ‘[n]
refugees have died!!!’ and, (b) losing one point for each refugee who died in
the truck. The neutral outcome (ONe)  consisted of  (a) the message ‘Road
closed’ and, (b) maintaining the previous score
2.  Outcome messages were
presented for 3 s. During the intertrial intervals, the lights were turned off (i.e.,
                                    
2 The neutral outcome (ONe) was presented (i.e., instead of presenting no outcome at all)
in order to give the participants feedback about the consequences of their behavior, not
only on reinforced (OAp) and punished (OAv) trials, but also on nonreinforced (ONe) trials.
This feedback given on AÆONe trials, as the feedback given on BÆOAv trials, aimed to
make explicit the absence of OAp.  Thus,  if  anything,  the  presentation of  a  neutral
outcome  increased  the  effectiveness  of  nonreinforced trials,  while  minimizing
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gray). The mean intertrial intervals duration was 5 s, ranging between 3 and 7
s.
The number  of  refugees loaded in  the  truck  during the  cue  was
reported in a box on the screen, this number being immediately updated after
each response. Although pressing the space bar during the outcome message
had no consequences, the number of refugees loaded in the truck during the
previous cue presentation remained visible during the presentation of the
outcome. Upon outcome termination, the score panel was initialized to 0.
Responses that occurred during the intertrial intervals had no consequence
and were not reflected in the panel.
The number of refugees that participants risked placing in the truck on
each trial was our dependent variable. During each cue presentation, each
response (i.e., pressing the space bar once) placed one refugee in the truck,
whereas holding the space bar down placed up to 30 refugees per second in
the truck. Therefore, the number of refugees placed in the truck not only
correlated with the number of responses (i.e., pressing the space bar), but also
with the intensity of these responses (i.e., holding the space bar  down).
However, for reasons of simplicity, we will refer to our dependent variable as
the number of responses. Alternatively, one could view our dependent variable
as reflecting the participants’ expectation of the appetitive outcome (OAp).
Presumably, the more certain the participants were that the cue would be
followed by OAp, the greater number of refugees they would place in the truck,
whereas the more certain participants were that the truck would explode (OAv)
or that the road would be closed (ONe), the fewer refugees they would place in
the truck.
All participants in the experiment were given 40 trials, 20  trials with
each of cues A and B. The half of the presentations of each cue was followed
OAp, and the other half was followed by a nonappetitive outcome. On these
nonreinforced trials, cues A and B were paired with ONe and OAv, respectively.
Thus, both cues A and B  were exposed  to  a  PRF  procedure in  which
responding was reinforced in the 50% of the trials, and responding was either
nonreinforced (cue A) or punished (cue B) in the other 50% of the trials. The
different trial types were presented following a  pseudorandom sequence,
which was given to the participants  twice during  the  experiment. This
sequence was AÆOAp, AÆOAp, BÆOAp, AÆONe, AÆONe, BÆOAv, BÆOAv,
AÆONe, BÆOAp, BÆOAv, AÆOAp, BÆOAv, BÆOAp, AÆONe,  BÆOAp,
BÆOAv, AÆONe, AÆOAp, BÆOAp, AÆOAp.
RESULTS
Figure 1 depicts the results of the experiment. As can be appreciated
from the figure, responding to both cues A and B (or, from an alternative view,
the ratings of these cues as predictors of OAp) initially increased from Trial 1
to Trial 2. However, after Trial 2 responding to  A  was  stronger  thanNonreinforcement and Punishment 95
responding to B on most of the trials. This impression was confirmed by a 2
(Cue: A vs. B) x 20 (Trials) ANOVA on the mean number of  responses,
which showed main effects of both cue, F(1, 13) = 11.81, p < .01, and trials,
F(19, 247) = 2.32, p < .01, as well as a Cue x Trials interaction, F(1, 247) =
2.41, p < .01. Also, pairwise comparisons showed that responding to cue A
was significantly stronger than responding to B on Trials 3, 4, 7-9, 11-14, and
18-20, all Fs(1, 13) > 5.69, ps < .05. The response elicited by A was also
marginally stronger than that elicited by B on Trials 15 and 17 (ps = .06 and
.07, respectively). On the rest of the trials, responding to cues A and B did not
differ (all ps > .10).
These results were not influenced by any differential responding during
the pre-cue period, as showed by a 2 (Cue: A vs. B) x 20 (Trials) ANOVA on
the number of responses during the 3-s period prior to the presentation of the
cue, which yielded no main effect nor significant interaction (all ps > .13).
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Figure 1. Results of the experiment. Mean number of responses to cues
A  and  B.  Cue  A  was  followed  by  either  OAp  (i.e.,  an  appetitive
outcome) or ONe (i.e., a neutral outcome), whereas cue B was followed
by either OAp  or OAv  (i.e.,  an  aversive outcome). Error bars  depict
standard error of the means.
DISCUSSION
The results of the present experiment showed that responding to cue B
(i.e., a cue paired with both an appetitive and an aversive outcome on different
trials) was more strongly impaired than responding to cue A (i.e., a cue paired
with both an appetitive and a  neutral  outcome  on  different trials).  As
previously discussed, these results cannot be explained by traditional models
of learning (e.g., Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980; Rescorla  &
Wagner, 1972; Wagner, 1981). According to these models, responding to aO. Pineño 96
cue in a PRF schedule is only determined by  the ratio of  reinforced and
nonreinforced trials, with total independence of the motivational quality of the
outcome presented during the nonreinforced trials. This is  showed in the
simulation
3 of the present experiment following the Rescorla and Wagner
model (see top panel of Figure 2). As can be seen in this simulation, this
model predicts that both cues A and  B  will progressively increase their
associative strength as training proceeds, reaching an asymptotic level of VA =
VB = 0.4. Thus, the associative strength of cues A and B will nearly resemble
the actual contingency of 0.5 for each cue with OAp (i.e., DP, Allan, 1980),
although slightly smaller due to the overshadowing (Pavlov, 1927) produced
by the contextual cues (which were included in the simulation).
Some post hoc manipulations could be performed in the parameters of
the Rescorla and Wagner (1972) model in order to enable this model to
explain the present results. For example, in those trials in which OAp is not
present, its salience (i.e., bnoOAp) could be assumed to be higher due to the
presentation of OAv, in comparison to its salience when ONe is presented. Or,
alternatively, when OAv is presented, the total amount of associative strength
supported by OAp (i.e., l) could adopt a negative value (e.g., -1) instead of a
null value. Finally, the strength of the appetitive response could be viewed as
reflecting the difference between the associative strengths that the cue acquired
with OAp and OAv (i.e., R = VAp - VAv, see Krank, 1985). However, none of
these manipulations are free from theoretical problems. First, in the Rescorla
and Wagner model an absent cue has a null salience (i.e., aCS = 0), whereas an
absent outcome has a positive salience (i.e., bnoOAp  > 0). This assumption,
which is necessary in order to allow this model to explain learning in the
absence of the outcome (e.g., extinction), implies an asymmetrical processing
of the cues  and  outcomes (but  see  Wagner, 1981).  Although the  latter
assumption can be acceptable, it is harder to see how this model could assume
that the value of bnoOAp can be greater due to the presentation of an aversive
outcome (OAv) than when a neutral outcome (ONe)  is  presented. Second,
assuming that l of OAp adopts a value of 0 and -1 during the presentations of
ONe or OAv, respectively, implies that, whereas the extinction procedure would
merely result in a loss of the previously acquired positive associative strength
(i.e., down to zero), counterconditioning training would result in the learning
of an inhibitory association (i.e., an associative strength of -1). This problem
also applies to the view of the appetitive response as reflecting the difference
between VAp and VAv. In this case, counterconditioning would be also expected
to yield a net negative or inhibitory appetitive response (i.e., R = VAp - VAv = 0
– 1).
                                    
3 The parameters used in this simulation were: aA = aA = 1, aCTX = 0.1, bOAp = 1, bnoOAp =
0.35, l = 1. This simulation was  performed using  the program developed by  Jason M.
Tangen. This software can be downloaded from
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Figure 2. Simulation of the results of the experiment by the Rescorla
and Wagner (1972) model (top panel) and IMAL (Pineño & Matute,
2003, bottom panel).O. Pineño 98
These results support the predictions of Konorski’s (1967) theory (see
also Rescorla & Solomon, 1967; Solomon & Corbit, 1974), which states that
the expression of an association between a cue and an appetitive outcome (i.e.,
cue-OAp) is more strongly impaired by training the cue with a motivationally
incompatible outcome (i.e., OAv) than with  a  neutral outcome (i.e., ONe).
However, since no real appetitive and aversive outcomes were presented in the
present experiment (i.e., the outcomes were endowed with motivational value
through instructions), in order for Konorski’s theory to explain the present
results, it should assume that the instructions enabled the presentation and
expectation of the outcomes to activate antagonist central emotional systems.
However, this assumption is questionable since one of the most prominent
features of this kind of preparations for the study of human learning  is
precisely their use of stimuli of low (or even null) biological significance (see
Miller & Matute, 1996).
The results of this experiment can be straightforwardly explained by
Pineño  and  Matute’s (2003)  integrative  model  of  associative learning
(IMAL). According to this model, a cue can become associated with the
representation of OAp, as well as with the representations of OAv  and ONe.
According to IMAL, the presentation of A-ONe and B-OAv trials will result in
the  formation  of,  not  only  A-OAp  and  B-OAp  inhibitory  associations
(Konorski,  1948),  but  also  A-ONe  and  B-OAv  excitatory  associations
(Konorski, 1967). Thus, the presentation each cue will elicit the simultaneous
expectation of incompatible outcomes (i.e., OAp and ONe, in the case of cue A,
and OAp and OAv in the case of cue B). As a consequence, the expression of
the target outcome (OAp) will be impaired, not only by  the learning of  an
inhibitory association between each cue and OAp, but also by the expectation
of the alternative and incompatible outcome. Moreover, in the framework of
IMAL, learning of the B-OAv association will proceed faster than learning of
the A-ONe association due to the high salience of OAv compared to that of ONe
(i.e., because OAv is motivationally more relevant than ONe). Thus, from the
initial trials of training, the expression of the OAp expectation will be more
strongly impaired in the presence of B than in the presence of A, due to the
interference caused by the expectation of OAv  (produced  by  the  B-OAv
association) being stronger than that caused by the expectation  of  ONe
(produced by the A-ONe association). This is depicted in the bottom panel of
Figure 2, which shows the simulation
4 of the present experiment by IMAL.
There  are  two  important  points  that  were  not  addressed  by  the
experiment and that deserve consideration. First, based on the  previous
explanation of the present results by Pineño and Matute’s (2003) IMAL, it is
evident that this model predicts that, given a number enough of A-ONe trials,
this association should completely interfere with the expression of the A-OAp
association (as the B-OAv association did with fewer trials). In other words,
                                     
4 The parameters used in this simulation were the predefined parameters for simulations of
experiments with human participants in the simulation program of Pineño and Matute’s
(2003) model. This program can be downloaded from
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this model predicts that, as PRF training proceeds, interference caused by the
expectation of ONe will become more pervasive. Although this  prediction
apparently contradicts the observation of response persistence in  PRF
procedures (Amsel, 1958), it receives some indirect support from experiments
showing that extinction occurs more rapidly following extensive PRF  than
following PRF with a moderate number of training trials (see McCain, Lee, &
Powell, 1962). However, the small number of trials in the present experiment
did not allow us to directly test this prediction. Future experimental work
should try to assess whether, as IMAL predicts, extensive PRF training with a
neutral outcome produces, in the long run, the same effect produced by PRF
training with an alternative aversive outcome in few trials.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge the potential influence of the use
of a within-subject design in the present experiment. Because all participants
received training with both cues A and B, responding to each cue could be (at
least partially) determined, not only by the outcomes directly paired with the
cue itself, but also by the outcomes paired with the alternative cue. That is,
responding to cue A could depend not only on the interaction between the
expectations of OAp and ONe, but also on the expectation of the absence of OAv
(i.e.,  due  to  OAv  being  always  presented  in  the  absence  of  cue  A).
Symmetrically, responding to cue B could depend not only on the interaction
between the expectations of OAp and OAv, but also on the expectation of the
absence of ONe (i.e., due to ONe being always presented in the absence of cue
B). If cues A and B were learned as inhibitors of OAv and ONe, respectively,
then cue A (but not cue B)  would become a signal for safety and, as  a
consequence, responding to cue A would result more strongly enhanced than
responding to cue B. Moreover, as the presentations of BÆOAv trials could
have increased responding to cue A, the presentations of AÆOAp trials could
have enhanced the suppression of responding to cue B. This latter possibility
is suggested by studies showing that the availability of an alternative source of
reinforcement (i.e., responding to cue A, in the present experiment) increases
the effectiveness of punishment treatments (e.g., Herman & Azrin, 1964). In
sum, the use of a within-subject design in the present experiment could have
determined to some extent the observed differential responding to the cues.
However, according to Pineño and Matute’s (2003) IMAL, although weak
inhibitory A-OAv and B-ONe associations could have been formed in  the
present experiment, responding to cues A and B  mainly depended on  the
interaction between the expectations of the outcomes directly paired with each
cue. Therefore, this model predicts that the present results should be replicable
using a between-group design in which partial reinforcement and  partial
punishment treatments are given in different conditions. This prediction of
IMAL also deserves, in our opinion, future empirical work.O. Pineño 100
RESUMEN
Efectos  Diferenciales  de  la  Ausencia  de  Reforzamiento  y  el
Castigo  en  Humanos. En una preparación de aprendizaje asociativo, los
participantes recibieron reforzamiento parcial (RP) con dos claves diferentes.
Para una  de las  claves,  las  presentaciones no  reforzadas consistieron en
emparejamientos de la clave con una consecuencia neutra, mientras que estas
presentaciones  consistieron  en  emparejamientos  con  una  consecuencia
aversiva para la otra clave. Los resultados mostraron que el entrenamiento de
RP produjo una fuerte respuesta ante la clave emparejada con la consecuencia
neutra en los ensayos no reforzados. Sin embargo, la respuesta ante la clave
emparejada con la consecuencia aversiva en los ensayos no reforzados resultó
fuertemente suprimida. Los presentes resultados son problemáticos para las
teorías actuales del aprendizaje (p.  ej.,  Rescorla y  Wagner, 1972),  pero
pueden  ser  explicados  por  teorías  clásicas  que  incluyen  mecanismos
motivacionales  (p.  ej.,  Konorski,  1967),  así  como  por  un  modelo
recientemente desarrollado, en el cual  las  expectativas de  consecuencias
incompatibles compiten por su expresión en la conducta (i.e., Pineño  &
Matute, 2003).
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